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In the past year, the staff of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System began using a new
macroeconomic model of the U.S. economy, referred
to as the FRB/US model. This system of mathemati-
cal equations describing interactions among eco-
nomic measures such as inﬂation, interest rates, and
gross domestic product (GDP) is used in economic
forecasting and the analysis of macroeconomic pol-
icy issues at the Board.
The FRB/US model replaces the MPS model,
which, with periodic revisions, had been used at the
Federal Reserve Board since the early 1970s.1 A key
feature of the new model is that expectations of
future economic conditions are explicit in many of its
equations. Because of the clear delineation of expec-
tations, issues that would have been difﬁcult or
impossible to study with the MPS model can now be
examined. For example, the new model can show
how the anticipation of future events, such as a
legislated reduction in future defense spending, may
affect the economy today. Similarly, the FRB/US
model can be used to examine the extent to which the
consequences for inﬂation of a sharp increase in the
price of oil depend on the course of monetary policy
anticipated by the public.
EXPECTATIONS IN MACROECONOMIC MODELS
Expectations play an important role in the economic
theories that underpin most macroeconomic models.
Planning for the future is a central part of economic
life. The need to make decisions about the type of car
to buy, the amount of education to pursue, and the
fraction of income to save forces households to think
about which choices make the most sense not just for
today but for years into the future. Similarly, business
ﬁrms, in deciding where to locate factories and
ofﬁces, what equipment to install, and what products
to develop and produce, make decisions with conse-
quences that may last many years. Individuals must
make informed guesses about circumstances in the
years ahead and then base decisions on these expec-
tations. The approach to expectations taken in the
FRB/US model is best understood in the context of a
debate that has engaged macroeconomists for the past
twenty-ﬁve years.
The Debate about Expectations
Economists have long recognized that expectations
play a prominent role in economic decisionmaking
and are a critical feature of macroeconomic models.
However, they disagree about the basis on which
individuals form expectations and thus about the way
to model them. For example, the conventional view is
that current consumption spending depends partly on
how large or small consumers expect their future
income to be. But economists are not in accord
over exactly what information consumers take into
account in forecasting future income.
The debate continues, partly because obtaining data
on expectations is difﬁcult. For example, surveys of
expectations are limited to a few economic variables,
such as inﬂation, and it is unclear whether the sur-
1. For further discussions of the FRB/US model, see Flint Brayton
and Peter Tinsley, ‘‘A Guide to FRB/US: A Macroeconomic Model
of the United States,’’ Finance and Economics Discussion Series,
1996-42 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1996;
available on the Board’s web site at http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/
feds/); Sharon Kozicki, Dave Reifschneider, and Peter Tinsley, ‘‘The
Behavior of Long-Term Interest Rates in the FRB/US Model,’’ The
Determinants of Long-Term Interest Rates and Exchange Rates and
the Role of Expectations, Bank for International Settlements Confer-
ence Papers, vol. 2 (Basle: Bank for International Settlements, 1996),
pp. 215–51; and Flint Brayton, Andrew Levin, Ralph Tryon, and
John C. Williams, ‘‘The Evolution of Macro Models at the Federal
Reserve Board,’’ Carnegie–Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy, forthcoming. The latter paper also discusses a new global
macroeconomic model, known as FRB/MCM, now used by the staff
of the Federal Reserve Board. See also Andrew Levin, ‘‘A Compari-
son of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules in the FRB Multi-Country
Model,’’ The Determinants of Long-Term Interest Rates, pp. 340–69.
For a discussion of the MPS model, see Flint Brayton and Eileen
Mauskopf, ‘‘The Federal Reserve Board MPS Quarterly Econometric
Model of the U.S. Economy,’’ Economic Modelling, vol. 3 (July
1985), pp. 170–292.veys accurately measure the expectations that inﬂu-
ence actual decisions. In some instances, expec-
tations can be inferred from nonsurvey data.
Expectations about future short-term interest rates,
for example, can be inferred by comparing the yields
on bonds of different maturities, given the assump-
tion that a bond’s yield depends on the sequence
of short-term interest rates expected over its term
to maturity, plus a term premium. However, this
approach provides accurate measures of expectations
only if this theory of the term structure of interest
rates is itself correct and if term premiums can be
reliably estimated.2
The lack of adequate data has meant that builders
of macroeconomic models have had to specify a
priori how individuals form expectations (see box
‘‘Assumptions about the Ways in Which Expectations
Are Formed’’). Most models developed in the 1960s
and 1970s, including MPS, incorporated the simplify-
ing assumption that people form expectations adap-
tively. Under this assumption, for example, the expec-
tation for inﬂation in the next year is based on the
recent inﬂation trend. Similarly, expected interest
rates depend on past interest rates.
Starting in the 1970s, a number of economists
strongly criticized this treatment of expectations in
macroeconomic models. Robert Lucas, in what has
become known as the ‘‘Lucas Critique,’’ argued that
analyzing alternative monetary and ﬁscal policies
using these models is of questionable value because
the adaptive approach fails to recognize that, in the
real world, people are likely to modify their expecta-
tions as policies are changed.3 According to Lucas
and others, individuals have economic incentives to
form accurate forecasts of future economic events,
and such forecasts include the anticipated effects of
the government’s macroeconomic policies. If the
Federal Reserve usually lowers interest rates during
recessions, for example, then individuals facing the
onset of a recession will base their forecasts of future
interest rates on the systematic relationship between
the cyclical state of the economy and interest rates.
Because of the criticism of adaptive expectations,
the assumption of rational expectations, which had
ﬁrst been proposed in the early 1960s, gained favor
among many macroeconomists.4 In a given macro-
economic model, expectations of future events are
rational if they are identical to the forecasts of that
model. Because it posits that individuals make full
use of all of the information embodied in the struc-
ture of a macroeconomic model, the rational expec-
tations approach has become one benchmark for
the estimation of unobserved expectations.
Cost–beneﬁt analysis provides a useful perspective
on this debate. In the view represented by models
employing adaptive expectations, either the costs of
2. Similarly, the Treasury’s recent issuance of bonds with returns
indexed to the consumer price index (CPI) may help in the measure-
ment of inﬂation expectations, which can be calculated by comparing
the rate of interest on conventional bonds with the rate on indexed
bonds. This approach, however, is subject to a number of potential
problems. For a discussion, see Martin D.D. Evans, ‘‘Index-Linked
Debt and the Real Term Structure: New Estimates and Implications
from the U.K. Bond Market,’’ New York University, Solomon Center,
Working Paper Series S-96-24 (March 1996).
3. Robert E. Lucas, ‘‘Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,’’
Carnegie–Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 1
(1976), pp. 19–46.
4. See John F. Muth, ‘‘Rational Expectations and the Theory of
Price Movements,’’ Econometrica, vol. 29 (1961), pp. 315–35. The
deﬁnition of rational expectations proposed by Muth (p. 316) includes
the statement that ‘‘the way [rational] expectations are formed depends
speciﬁcally on the structure of the relevant system describing the
economy.’’
Assumptions about the Ways in Which
Expectations Are Formed
Macroeconomic models have relied on several different
assumptions about how individuals form expectations of
future economic conditions:
Adaptive expectations depend only on past observa-
tions of the variable in question. Most econometric mod-
els developed in the 1960s and 1970s, including the MPS
model, employed this assumption.
Rational, or model-consistent, expectations are identi-
cal to the forecasts produced by the macroeconomic
model in which the expectations are used. This assump-
tion has been used in many macroeconomic models
developed in the past ﬁfteen years and is one option for
the formation of expectations used in FRB/US.
VAR expectations are identical to the forecasts of a
small vector autoregression (VAR) model that includes
equations for a few key economic measures (see box
‘‘Types of Macroeconomic Models’’ for a description of
a VAR model). This is another option for expectations
formation used in FRB/US.
Adaptive and VAR expectations may be rational if they
are used in a macroeconomic model with a coinciding
structure. For example, if actual inﬂation depends only
on past inﬂation, then adaptive expectations of inﬂation
will be rational.
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high, or the beneﬁts from improved forecast accuracy
are slight. Thus, individuals form their expectations
of the future using simple rules of thumb or easily
computed formulas, such as adaptive expectations.
At the other extreme is the view underlying the
rational expectations approach. In this case, collect-
ing and analyzing information is assumed to have
small costs and large beneﬁts, and consequently indi-
viduals base expectations on sophisticated forecast-
ing models that make use of all relevant data.
Between these extremes is the view that forecast-
ing has both signiﬁcant advantages and signiﬁcant
costs. Such a circumstance should lead households
and ﬁrms to choose forecasting models that closely
resemble their economic environment but fall short
of a complete model of the economy in every detail.5
In FRB/US, one of the options for expectations for-
mation, referred to as VAR expectations, is motivated
by this view.
Separation of Expectations from Actions
in FRB/US
An important feature of the new model is the explicit
separation of expectations regarding future events
from delayed responses to these expectations. This
separation does not exist in traditional structural
macroeconomic models (see box ‘‘Types of Macro-
economic Models’’), partly because the expectations
of ﬁrms and households are unobservable and partly
because the structures of these models are not based
on formal theories of optimal planning over time.
Thus, traditional structural models cannot distinguish
whether changes in activity are a function of altered
expectations today or lagged responses to past plans.
For example, they cannot determine whether a rise in
business capital investment is attributable to revised
expectations about sales or is part of a sequence of
gradual capital acquisitions related to earlier invest-
ment plans.
FRB/US removes this ambiguity by explictly pars-
ing observed dynamic behavior into movements that
have been induced by changes in expectations and
responses to expectations that have been delayed
because of adjustment costs. This separation rests on
two assumptions. One is that the unobserved expecta-
tions of ﬁrms and households can be adequately
captured by forecasts of an explicit model of the
economy. The second is that participants in the econ-
omy behave so as to achieve the highest possible
expected welfare and proﬁts over time. Although
these assumptions are similar to those usually found
5. In recent years, the view that information about the economy is
costly to obtain and analyze has spurred some economists to study
how individuals’ knowledge about the economy might increase
over time as they observe their economic environment. Different
approaches to learning are discussed in Thomas J. Sargent, Bounded
Rationality in Macroeconomics (Clarendon, 1993).
Types of Macroeconomic Models
FRB/US is one of many macroeconomic models that
have been developed over the past thirty years. Macro-
economic models are systems of equations that sum-
marize the interactions among such economic variables
as gross domestic product (GDP), inﬂation, and interest
rates. These models can be grouped into several types:
Traditional structural models typically follow the
Keynesian paradigm featuring sluggish adjustment of
prices. These models usually assume that expectations
are adaptive but subsume them in the general dynamic
structure of speciﬁc equations in such a way that the
contribution of expectations alone is not identiﬁed. The
MPS and Multi-Country (MCM) models formerly used at
the Federal Reserve Board are examples.
Rational expectations structural models explicitly
incorporate expectations that are consistent with the mod-
el’s structure. Examples include variants of the FRB/US
and FRB/MCM models currently used at the Federal
Reserve Board, Taylor’s multi-country model, and the
IMF’s Multimod.1
Equilibrium business-cycle models assume that labor
and goods markets are always in equilibrium and that
expectations are rational. All equations are closely based
on assumptions that households maximize their own wel-
fare and ﬁrms maximize proﬁts. Examples are models
developed by Kydland and Prescott and by Christiano
and Eichenbaum.2
Vector autoregression (VAR) models employ a small
number of estimated equations to summarize the dynamic
behavior of the entire macroeconomy, with few restric-
tions from economic theory beyond the choice of vari-
ables to include in the model. Sims is the original propo-
nent of this type of model.3
1. John B. Taylor, Macroeconomic Policy in a World Economy
(Norton, 1993); Paul Masson, Steven Symansky, Rick Haas, and Michael
Dooley, ‘‘MULTIMOD: A Multi-Region Econometric Model,’’ Staff Stud-
ies for the World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund, 1988).
2. Finn Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, ‘‘Time to Build and Aggre-
gate Fluctuations,’’ Econometrica, vol. 50 (1982), pp. 1345–70; Law-
rence J. Christiano and Martin Eichenbaum, ‘‘Current Real-Business-
Cycle Theories and Aggregate Labor-Market Fluctuations,’’ American
Economic Review, vol. 82 (1992), pp. 430–50.
3. Christopher Sims, ‘‘Macroeconomics and Reality,’’ Econometrica,
vol. 48 (1980), pp. 1–48.
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FRB/US model uses a more general description of
frictions to more closely match the correlations in
historical time-series data.
OPTIONS FOR EXPECTATIONS FORMATION
IN FRB/US
The FRB/US model is designed so that alternative
assumptions can be made about the scope of informa-
tion that households and ﬁrms use in forming expec-
tations and the speed with which they revise their
expectations on the basis of new information.
Because of the lack of detailed knowledge on how
individuals actually form expectations, the grounds
are weak for choosing one assumption over all oth-
ers. The ﬂexibility of FRB/US makes it possible
to gauge the sensitivity of conclusions drawn from
model simulations to alternative assumptions about
the way expectations are formed.6
Scope of Information
Two alternative assumptions regarding the scope of
information are used in the FRB/US model. One is
that expectations are rational, or model-consistent. In
this case, households and ﬁrms are assumed to have a
detailed understanding of how the economy func-
tions, and expectations are identical to the forecasts
of the FRB/US model.
The other alternative is that expectations are based
on a less elaborate understanding of the economy,
as represented by a small forecasting model contain-
ing only a few important macroeconomic variables.
Because the form of the forecasting model is simi-
lar to that of a vector autoregression (VAR), such
expectations are called VAR expectations. The VAR
approach in the FRB/US model assumes that house-
holds and ﬁrms form expectations primarily on the
basis of their knowledge of the historical interactions
among three variables: the federal funds rate, the
cyclical state of the economy, and the rate of inﬂa-
tion (see box ‘‘The Forecasting Model for VAR
Expectations’’).
The FRB/US model can also be simulated under
the assumption that the scope of information used in
forming expectations is greater for some participants
in the economy than for others. For instance, the
expectations of investors in ﬁnancial markets may
be based on more detailed information and more
sophisticated forecasting models than are those of
households—a difference that can be approximated
by making the expectations of investors model-
consistent and those of households VAR.
Speed of Expectations Revision
Another dimension of expectations formation is the
speed with which households’ and ﬁrms’ views of the
economy respond to changes in the economic envi-
ronment. Of particular importance in analyzing the
effects of monetary and ﬁscal policy actions is how
quickly the public recognizes that a deliberate change
in policy has occurred or will occur sometime in the
future.
In some instances, households and ﬁrms may rec-
ognize that a shift in policy has occurred only after
some time has elapsed. FRB/US allows for the
gradual adjustment of expectations about some key
long-run conditions to changes in policy objectives
so as to mimic the process of learning. For example,
under either VAR or model-consistent expectations, a
shift in monetary policy intended to reduce inﬂation
can be simulated using alternative assumptions about
how quickly the change in policy is recognized by the
public. If recognition is assumed to be slow, expecta-
tions about long-run inﬂation are speciﬁed to adjust
slowly. Conversely, rapid recognition is associated
with fast adjustment of inﬂation expectations.
In other instances, a policy action—or the likeli-
hood of the action—may be recognized in advance.
For example, movements in bond yields have at
times been attributed to revised expectations of future
government ﬁscal actions.7 Under model-consistent
expectations, anticipation of future policy changes or
of other events can be introduced simply by including
knowledge of the event in the information that ﬁrms
and households use when forecasting. In the case of
VAR expectations, advance recognition, if appropri-
ate, is introduced by specifying that expectations of
both long-run inﬂation and interest rates respond
before the event.
6. The legitimacy of shifting among alternative speciﬁcations of
expectations formation rests on the assumption that the coefﬁcients
in the equations of FRB/US are unaffected by such changes in
speciﬁcation.
7. For a discussion of such effects during 1993, see Council of
Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (February
1994), pp. 78–87.
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DECISIONMAKING
In the FRB/US model, expectations about future eco-
nomic conditions inﬂuence current prices and activity
by means of two distinct channels. Through the ﬁrst
channel, asset valuation, today’s price of an asset is
linked to the expected earnings stream of the asset
and the expected rate of return on alternative assets.
Thus, in the model, current bond and stock prices
are determined by the present discounted value of
expected coupon and dividend payments. Through
the second channel, adjustment dynamics, expecta-
tions play a role in reducing the costs of economic
frictions. Households, in maximizing their welfare,
and ﬁrms, in maximizing their proﬁts, face various
frictions in pursuing their goals, such as costs asso-
ciated with adjusting the rate of household pur-
chases of durable goods or the rate of business invest-
ment in capital equipment. In FRB/US, small changes
in activity, made over several periods, are generally
less costly than the same cumulative change made in
a single period. As a result, anticipation of relevant
future conditions beneﬁts households and ﬁrms. The
more accurately they forecast future events, the less
frequently they must make large revisions to their
economic plans and, consequently, the lower are their
adjustment costs.
Asset Valuation
Tying the current price of an asset to its expected
future earnings is a common way of modeling bond
and equity prices and is not unique to FRB/US. The
price of a bond equals the ﬂow of payments (coupons
The Forecasting Model for VAR Expectations
VAR expectations in FRB/US are the forecasts of a model
that has at its core a set of three equations—one each for the
federal funds rate, inﬂation, and the output gap. The equa-
tions contain an identical set of explanatory variables con-
sisting of the ﬁrst lagged value of the deviation of each
variable from its expected long-run value and three lagged
values of the ﬁrst difference of each core variable. Coefﬁ-
cient estimates indicate that the system of core equations is
stable, meaning that forecasts of outcomes far into the
future converge to the measures of long-run expectations
observed on the date they are formed. Long-run expec-
tations for inﬂation are taken from survey data, and those
for the federal funds rate from forward interest rates. The
long-run expectation of the output gap is assumed to be
zero. In the equations in this box, each set of weights
(wj,i,j =1 ,2...9 )sums to one.
(1) Drt = .03(p-p e
¥) t-1+ .12 (x ˜ - 0)t - 1
- .05 (r - re
¥)t - 1 + .33 S
3
i =1




w 2,iDx ˜t - i - .27 S
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i =1
w 3,iDrt - i.
(2) Dpt = .17(p-p e
¥) t-1+ .13 (x ˜ - 0)t - 1
- .01 (r - re
¥)t - 1 - .27 S
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w 5,iDx ˜t - i + .02 S
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w 6,iDrt - i.
(3) Dx ˜t = .02(p-p e
¥) t-1-.04(x ˜ - 0)t - 1
- .21(r - re
¥)t - 1 + .09 S
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w 8,iDx ˜t - i + .08 S
3
i =1
w 9,iDrt - i.
The variables are deﬁned as follows:
r = federal funds rate
p = inﬂation rate of chain-weight price index for per-
sonal consumption expenditures
x ˜ = percentage gap between actual and potential output
pe
¥ = expected long-run rate of inﬂation
re
¥ = expected long-run value of the federal funds rate.
The set of equations is able to generate expectations
of the values of the three core variables at any future
date. (Forecasts of pe
¥ and re
¥ equal their most recent
observed value.) For each additional variable for which
an expectation appears in FRB/US, an auxiliary equation,
which expresses the variable as a function of its own
past values and of the set of explanatory variables appear-
ing in the core equations, is added to the forecasting
model.
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owner of the bond discounted by the opportunity cost
of holding the bond. Because an alternative to hold-
ing a bond is holding a sequence of short-lived assets,
the opportunity cost can be represented, in part, by
the set of short-term interest rates expected to prevail
over the bond’s term to maturity. Thus, the bond’s
yield depends on expected future short-term interest
rates, plus a term premium to compensate for the
difference in risk exposure from holding the bond
instead of the sequence of short-term assets (see box
‘‘Equation for the Ten-Year Treasury Bond Yield’’).
Similarly, the value of corporate equity depends
on the present discounted value of the expected divi-
dend stream accruing to the owner of the equity. In
FRB/US, the opportunity cost of holding equity is
proportional to the corporate bond rate adjusted for
expected inﬂation. Thus, expectations about future
dividends, future inﬂation, and future short-term
interest rates, as captured by the corporate bond rate,
determine the current price of equity.
FRB/US also applies the link between the current
value of an asset and its expected earnings stream to
the valuation of human capital, where the ﬂow of
earnings is that expected by an individual over his
or her lifetime. The need to have a measure of the
value of human capital arises from a theory of con-
sumption in which households base current spending
not on current income but on the expected average of
income over their remaining lifetime. Households
borrow and lend in banking and capital markets to
adjust for discrepancies between actual income and
average expected income. In FRB/US, the value of
human capital is deﬁned as the present discounted
value of expected future wage income net of taxes
and inclusive of transfer payments.
Adjustment Dynamics
The need for expectations in areas of decisionmak-
ing other than asset valuation is determined by the
strength of frictions or constraints on dynamic adjust-
ments. As discussed below, slower responses require
longer lead times as provided by forecasts of more
distant events.
In the nonﬁnancial sectors of FRB/US, decisions
by households and ﬁrms rest on forecasts of equilib-
rium goals that would be selected in the absence of
frictions but, because of costs in adjusting activities,
are only gradually achieved. Consequently, the econ-
omy generally is characterized by disequilibrium,
with ﬁrms and households behaving optimally but
being constrained from immediate movement to equi-
librium. Indeed, apart from the expectations required
for asset valuation, the condition of gradual adjust-
ments to equilibrium is the main reason that ﬁrms and
households need to look ahead.
Displacements from equilibrium levels of activity
are in many cases due to unexpected events, such as
differences between anticipated and actual household
income or between expected and realized business
sales. The restoration of equilibrium is subject to
planning lags, contractual requirements, and other
frictions that inhibit full adjustment to equilibrium
within a quarter. The extent of frictions varies by
activity, so the speed at which equilibrium is restored
varies across activities and sectors.
Diagram 1 illustrates differences in behavior due to
differences in the extent of friction constraints on
dynamic adjustment. Typically, a household purchase
Equation for the Ten-Year
Treasury Bond Yield
According to the expectations theory of the term struc-
ture, the current yield on ten-year Treasury bonds equals
a weighted average of the values of the federal funds rate
expected over the forty-quarter term of the bond, plus a
term premium,




where Et{.} denotes forecasts based on information avail-
able during the current quarter and the weights, wi, sum
to one. In the FRB/US model, the term premium,
µt = .46 - .79Et{ S
39
i =0
w ix ˜ t+i},
equals a constant, a cyclical component that varies
inversely with the expected gap between actual and
potential output, and an unexplained residual (not
shown).
The variables are deﬁned as follows:
r10 = yield on ten-year Treasury bonds
r = federal funds rate
µ = term premium
x ˜ = percentage gap between actual and potential
output.
232 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1997of a staple commodity is not subject to signiﬁcant
adjustment costs. The decision to purchase such a
staple—milk—is depicted in the diagram, in which
the horizontal axis denotes time; t denotes ‘‘today,’’
the current period; and line y* denotes the equilib-
rium amount of milk consumption for each period.
The equilibrium amount of milk consumption is
assumed to grow over time as the expected number
or age of children in the household increases. The
amount of milk carried over from the past, ya,i s
below the equilibrium amount needed for today’s
consumption, yb. In this example, frictions are not a
signiﬁcant constraint on dynamic adjustment because
milk is readily available at a nearby store. Thus, the
decision to purchase additional milk is followed by
an action that restores the amount of milk on hand to
the equilibrium level, yb. In the absence of signiﬁcant
frictions, forecasts of future requirements for milk are
unnecessary because the household can quickly
adjust the stock of milk to the equilibrium level
required in each subsequent period.
The diagram also depicts a situation in which
forward-looking expectations are necessary because
of the presence of signiﬁcant frictions—for example,
the purchase by a ﬁrm of new capital equipment.
Because the ﬁrm expects to increase its output, the
path of equilibrium purchases, y*, rises over time. In
this example, ya represents yesterday’s level of equip-
ment investment, which is assumed to be below the
equilibrium level, yb, that is consistent with demand
and cost conditions today. In contrast to the earlier
example, only a fraction of the gap between the
previous level of investment, ya, and the current
equilibrium level, yb, will be eliminated in the current
period, t. Delays in adjusting investment may be due
not only to the need to collect and assimilate informa-
tion on customer needs and supplier costs but also to
lags in developing engineering and management
speciﬁcations for the new equipment. The ﬁrm may
select a slower delivery schedule if equipment pro-
ducers charge more for early delivery. Finally, addi-
tional delays may occur because of the time needed
for the installation of the new equipment and the
training of operators.
Confronted by these constraints on adjustment, the
ﬁrm decides on a program of gradual adjustment to
equilibrium. Based on the average speed of quarterly
adjustment for equipment investment estimated from
historical data, the ﬁrm moves the current level of
equipment investment to yc, which is about 15 per-
cent closer to the equilibrium, yb, than the level of
investment in the previous period, ya. In each subse-
quent period the ﬁrm reduces the distance between
the actual and equilibrium rates of investment about
15 percent, as shown by the line curving from yc to
the equilibrium path y*.
Although diagram 1 is useful in illustrating the
difference between rapid adjustment to equilibrium in
the absence of frictions and gradual adjustment to
equilibrium when frictions are present, it does not
directly indicate the way in which expectations of
future goals inﬂuence dynamic adjustments under
frictions. That is, diagram 1 provides an external
observer’s view of different adjustment speeds result-
ing from differences in the importance of frictions in
speciﬁc economic activities, but it does not reveal the
nature of the decisionmaking process used by ﬁrms
and households.8 As indicated in the box ‘‘Optimiz-
ing Actions When Change Is Costly,’’ an optimal
action today reﬂects plans for adjustment formulated
in earlier periods and revised plans for the future
based on current information. Thus, in the case of
business capital investment, decisions in the current
period are based on a weighted average of equilib-
rium values for past periods and expected equilib-
rium values for future periods.
Diagram 2 presents the intertemporal planning per-
spective of a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm for which fric-
tions are important constraints on actions. The verti-
cal line indicates the decisionmaker’s location in
8. The forward-planning aspect of decisionmaking is absent in the
partial adjustment equations frequently used in traditional structural
models to represent the dynamic behavior depicted in diagram 1. In
such equations, action in the current period is related to the distance
that remains between today’s equilibrium and yesterday’s action:
yt = yt-1 + l(y* t - yt-1), where yt denotes today’s action and y* t is
today’s equilibrium value.
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appear to the right of the vertical line, and past
quarters to the left. The three curves show the
relative-importance weights used in planning for dif-
ferent economic activities and are based on the
dynamic responses estimated for these activities in
the FRB/US model.
The curve labeled ‘‘Equipment investment’’ de-
picts the relative-importance weights of past and
expected future events in determining investment in
capital equipment. Although in principle ﬁrms plan
over an inﬁnite future, the effective length of the
planning period is determined by the extent of the
frictions associated with the ﬁrm’s actions. The
relative-importance weights for only the past three
years and future three years are plotted because the
weights for more distant quarters are close to zero. In
Optimizing Actions When Change Is Costly
Firms and households in FRB/US balance the expected
costs of deviating from equilibrium against the costs of
changing their actions. Expected future costs are discounted
so that those in distant periods have a smaller inﬂuence on
current actions than do those in near-term periods. The
optimization of tradeoffs between the costs of current and
future actions is represented in FRB/US by the assumption
that individuals minimize the following weighted sum of
expected current and future costs:
Et - 1{ S
¥
i =0
B i[ c 0( y t+i-y* t + i)2 + c1(D yt + i)2
+ c2(D2 yt + i)2 + c3(D3 yt + i)2 + . . .]},
where Et - 1{.} is a forecast of future costs based on informa-
tion available at the end of the previous period, t - 1, and B
is a discount factor between zero and one. The ﬁrst squared
term in the summation is the cost of deviating from equilib-
rium in period t + i, where c0 is the unit cost associated with
squared deviations from equilibrium, yt + i is the planned
activity, and y* t + i is the associated equilibrium.
The remaining terms in the cost function deﬁne the
expected costs of frictions associated with changes in
actions. D is a mathematical shorthand to represent the
one-period change in a variable, such as Dyt º (yt - yt - 1),
and D2yt ºD ( y t-y t-1)º((yt - yt - 1) - (yt - 1 - yt - 2)). Many
macroeconomic models assume that the principal source of
friction in observed behavior is represented by the term
c1(Dyt + i)2, where c1 is the unit cost of changing the level
of activity. A more generalized description of frictions is
permitted in FRB/US, with c2 representing the unit cost
of changing the growth rate of actions, c3 representing the
unit cost of changing the rate of acceleration, and so on.
The decision rule that minimizes this weighted sum of
expected costs can be represented as the following:1
Dyt = a0(y* t-1 - yt-1)+ S
m-1
j=1
a jD y t-j+E t-1{S
¥
i=0
f iD y* t + i}.
Optimal adjustment of activity in the current period, Dyt,
depends on three components: (1) the deviation of last
period’s activity from its equilibrium level, y* t - 1 - yt - 1;
(2) past changes in the levels of activity, Dyt - j (these lagged
terms are not present if ﬁrms or households minimize only
the costs associated with changing the level of activity); and
(3) a weighted forecast of future changes in equilibrium
levels, Dy* t + i (the forecast weights, fi, are functions of the
discount factor, B, and the cost parameters, c0, c1, c2,... ) .
The optimal level of activity, yt, deﬁned by this decision
rule can be expressed equivalently as a two-sided moving
average in past and future equilibrium values:
yt = Et - 1{ S
¥
i = -¥
wi y* t + i},
where the wi weights, indicating the relative importance
for current decisions of past and future equilibrium values,
sum to one. The estimated relative-importance weights for
selected activities in FRB/US are plotted in diagram 2.
1. See Peter A. Tinsley, ‘‘Fitting Both Data and Theories: Polynomial
Adjustment Costs and Error Correction Decision Rules,’’ Finance and Eco-
nomics Discussion Series, 93-21 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1993).
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234 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1997the case of equipment investment, the initial twelve
quarters of the planning period (to the right of the
vertical line) account for about 90 percent of the
relative-importance weights over the inﬁnite plan-
ning period. Equilibrium levels further in the future
are less important to current investment than are
those in the nearer term because more-distant needs
can be satisﬁed by equipment purchases in future
quarters.
A summary measure of the effective average length
of the forward planning period is the mean lead
determined by the relative-importance weights.9
Because frictions play a large role in dynamic adjust-
ments for capital equipment, the mean lead for equip-
ment investment is relatively lengthy—approximately
six quarters.
Weights for past quarters (to the left of the vertical
line) indicate the relative importance of past equi-
librium levels for current decisions. The relative-
importance weights for past planning periods also
approach zero for distant quarters because older plans
have been completed by past actions. In a construc-
tion similar to that used to deﬁne the mean lead,
relative-importance weights for past quarters can
be used to estimate the mean lag response. This
construction is useful as a measure of the average
speed at which ﬁrms respond to unexpected shocks
because, by deﬁnition, ﬁrms cannot respond in
advance to unforseen events. In the FRB/US model,
the mean lag for responses involving equipment
investment is about seven quarters.
Lead and lag responses for activities less affected
by frictions in FRB/US also appear in diagram 2. One
is the adjustment of output prices by ﬁrms to better
reﬂect current and anticipated demand and cost con-
ditions. In the FRB/US model, the prices of most
goods and services are ‘‘sticky,’’ or slow to adjust
to equilibrium. This behavior contrasts with that of
models based on classical theories, in which the
prices of goods and services are as ﬂexible as those in
ﬁnancial markets. The curve labeled ‘‘Output prices’’
illustrates the relative importance ﬁrms assign to past
and future equilibrium values in deciding the current
price of business output. Because the frictions for
pricing are smaller than those for equipment invest-
ment, the equilibrium values in periods close to the
current quarter are assigned higher weights, and
periods further from the current quarter are assigned
lower weights. Consequently, the mean lead for pric-
ing is markedly shorter—about three quarters.
Diagram 2 also illustrates the one-sided format of
relative-importance weights used in asset valuations.
Because frictions are of negligible importance in
ﬁnancial markets, asset valuations are only forward-
looking, and the bond yield is determined by fore-
casts of the federal funds rate over the maturity
of the bond. For a ten-year Treasury coupon bond
(the example plotted in diagram 2), the relative-
importance weights of expected future funds rates
decline over the ten-year planning period. Conse-
quently, the associated mean lead is about four years.
OVERVIEW OF THE EQUATIONS IN FRB/US
The FRB/US model takes into account decisions
in three sectors: (1) the household sector, where
households make choices about spending, saving,
and entering or leaving the workforce; (2) the private
business sector, where ﬁrms make investment,
employment, pricing, production, and ﬁnancial plans;
and (3) the public sector, where local, state, and
federal governments (including the Federal Reserve)
set monetary and ﬁscal policies.10 FRB/US models
the behavior of these sectors in the aggregate, but
some equations do allow for differences among
households or among ﬁrms. For example, because
small businesses have less ready access to capital
markets than large corporations have and must rely
more heavily on internal funds to ﬁnance capital
investment, the equation for investment in busi-
ness equipment allows the amount of investment to
depend, in part, on ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow.
About half of the approximately ﬁfty behavioral
equations in the model—estimated from thirty years
of historical data—use explicit measures of expecta-
tions. Of this half, the adjustment-dynamics frame-
work is used for the equations for consumption of
nondurable goods and services; spending on con-
sumer durables of two types; investment in residen-
tial structures, producers’ durable equipment, and
manufacturing and trade inventories; aggregate labor
hours; the price level and rate of hourly labor
9. The mean lead is calculated by multiplying the sequential num-









where wii is the relative-importance weight for the ith quarter in the
planning period.
10. Decisions made by ﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks are
not modeled directly, but instead are captured by equations that link
rates on consumer and business loans and home mortgages to those on
comparable government securities.
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approach is used for the equations for the yields on
three types of bonds; the market value of corporate
equities; and the exchange rate. The other behavioral
equations—including those for exports, imports,
employment, labor supply, investment in nonresi-
dential construction, and the stock of inventories
outside of manufacturing and trade—are estimated
using traditional speciﬁcations without explicit
expectations.
Household Sector
In the model, households maximize their welfare,
which is measured by the present discounted value of
expected utility derived from the consumption of
nondurable goods and services.11 Households are
assumed to prefer a smooth pattern of consumption
over time and therefore base their spending on
estimates of permanent income—deﬁned to be pro-
portional to the sum of human capital and other
wealth—rather than on current income alone. By
doing so, a household is able to maintain a relatively
stable standard of living over its lifetime even if its
income ﬂuctuates substantially. This model of con-
sumption is commonly referred to as the ‘‘life-cycle’’
model.12
The equation for consumption of nondurable goods
and services follows the life-cycle model by allowing
aggregate consumption spending to depend on the
distribution of income and assets across the popula-
tion (see box ‘‘Consumption of Nondurable Goods
and Services’’). For example, the life-cycle model
predicts that the marginal propensity to consume—
the increase in spending associated with a dollar
increase in income or assets—is higher for retirees
than for young workers, who are assumed to be
saving for their retirement and their children’s educa-
tion. Thus, the consumption equation incorporates
an estimated higher marginal propensity to consume
out of social security beneﬁts (as well as other trans-
fer income) than out of after-tax labor income. Con-
sequently, a shift of resources from workers to
retirees in the form of equal increases in payroll
taxes and social security beneﬁts is predicted to raise
total spending on consumer goods and to reduce
saving.
The standard life-cycle approach is modiﬁed for
FRB/US in three important ways. First, in evaluating
lifetime income, households discount their expected
future income at a rate estimated to be 25 percent per
year. Such a high rate of discount reﬂects the signiﬁ-
cant degree of uncertainty that households attach to
their future earnings. Given this rate, expected after-
tax wage and transfer income over the next ﬁve years
makes up about three-fourths of human capital.13
Second, consumption adjusts to permanent income
only gradually (in accordance with the adjustment-
cost approach described earlier). The frictions that
slow adjustment are relatively small, however, and
spending therefore adjusts to the level warranted by
permanent income at an estimated rate of 20 percent
per quarter. Finally, an estimated 10 percent of total
consumption is accounted for by a group of house-
holds that spend on the basis of current rather than
permanent income, perhaps because their access to
credit is limited.14
Besides choosing how much to consume, house-
holds also decide how much to spend on housing,
motor vehicles, and other consumer durable goods.
Because housing and durable goods last for many
years, purchases of these items are modeled as capital
investments, where the cost depends in part on the
inﬂation-adjusted interest rate on consumer loans or
home mortgages. As with the consumption of non-
durable goods and services, the equations for pur-
chases of motor vehicles, other durable goods, and
housing reﬂect households’ gradual adjustment to
equilibrium.
Income that households do not spend on goods and
services is assumed to be invested in various ﬁnancial
assets, including Treasury and corporate securities.
Households are assumed to be risk averse, and the
equations for returns on long-term bonds and stocks
11. In the FRB/US model, the measure of consumption of nondura-
ble goods and services includes the ﬂow of services from durable
goods and therefore differs from the data published under the same
name in the national income and product accounts.
12. The life-cycle model was introduced in the 1950s by Franco
Modigliani and Richard Brumberg. It is described in A. Ando and
F. Modigliani, ‘‘The Life-Cycle Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate
Implications and Tests,’’ American Economic Review, vol. 53 (1963),
pp. 55–84.
13. The idea that income may be discounted at a rate well in excess
of the market rate of interest was originally proposed by Milton
Friedman in his description of the permanent income model of con-
sumption. See Friedman, ‘‘Windfalls, the Horizon, and Related Con-
cepts in the Permanent Income Hypothesis,’’ in Carl Christ and others,
eds., Measurement in Economics (Stanford University Press, 1963),
pp. 3–28.
14. For a number of reasons, including the presence of credit-
constrained households, Ricardian Equivalence—the independence of
private consumption and the level of government debt—does not hold
in the FRB/US model. For example, a temporary reduction in current
income taxes funded through the issuance of bonds redeemed over
thirty years leads to a short-run increase in consumption in FRB/US.
236 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1997include term and risk premiums that compensate
households for the risks they bear in holding them.
Through the process of arbitrage, asset prices are
assumed to adjust rapidly, and risk-adjusted returns
are equalized across assets.
Finally, the decision to participate in the workforce
is modeled in a relatively simple way that captures
the time trends in participation over the past thirty
years and the tendency for the participation rate to
rise during periods of high employment. The aggre-
gate supply of labor is assumed not to respond to the
wage rate or to taxes.
Business Sector
In the model, ﬁrms maximize the present discounted
value of expected proﬁts. They set prices for their
products, negotiate wages and beneﬁts with their
employees, and decide how much to invest in build-
ings and equipment, how much inventory to hold,
and how many workers to employ and the length of
the workweek. They also select the amount of proﬁts
paid out as dividends. Expectations enter these equa-
tions because of the need for planning that arises
from adjustment costs.
Consumption of Nondurable Goods and Services
The equilibrium level of consumption depends on current
values of stock market and other property wealth and on the
present discounted value of expected future income. Income
is divided into labor, transfer, and property components,
where labor income is represented by total income less the
sum of transfer and property income. Expectations of future
income are discounted at the rate of 7 percent per quarter.
The equilibrium level of consumption also varies procycli-
cally, as represented by the positive coefﬁcient on the
output gap, Xgap. The adjustment equation for consumption
indicates that optimal dynamic planning determines about
90 percent of consumption but that about 10 percent (the
coefﬁcient on D log Yh, t) of consumption moves with cur-
rent income, possibly because of liquidity constraints.
(1) log C* t = .8307 Et{log[(1 - .93)( S
i =0
¥
.93iYh, t + i)]}








+ .0325 log W ps, t + .144 log W po, t
+ .00801 Xgap, t - .262.
(2) D log Ct = .000554 + .154(log C* t - 1 - log Ct - 1)
+ .208 D log Ct - 1
+( 1-.0995)Et - 1{ S
i =0
¥
f iDlog C* t+i }
+ .0995 D log Yh, t
- (.0995 * .208) D log Yh, t - 1.
Sfi = .74.
Deﬁnitions
C = Consumption of nondurable goods and services
(including service ﬂow from the stock of durables),
billions of chained (1992) dollars.
Et = Expectational operator, using information avail-
able at time t.
W po = Household property wealth excluding stock market
assets, divided by price index for C.
W ps = Household stock market wealth, divided by price
index for C.
Xgap = Percentage deviation between real GDP and its
potential level.
Yh = After-tax total household income, divided by price
index for C.
Yhp = After-tax household property income, divided by
price index for C.
Yht = Household transfer income, divided by price index
for C.
* = Equilibrium value.
The Role of Expectations in the FRB/US Macroeconomic Model 237In FRB/US, most ﬁrms sell their products in mar-
kets characterized by imperfect competition; that is, a
ﬁrm sets the prices of goods it sells as a markup over
costs of production (see box ‘‘Prices and Wages’’).
Abstracting from frictions that impede price adjust-
ment, the proﬁt-maximizing price markup varies
inversely with the degree of slack in the economy as
measured by the unemployment rate. This relation-
ship is illustrated by the downward-sloping line in
diagram 3. In the model, ﬁrms are inhibited by the
reactions of their customers and competitors from
changing their prices too rapidly in response to
changes in costs or demand. Prices adjust to their
equilibrium level at a rate estimated to be 25 percent
per quarter.
The equation for the rate of hourly labor compensa-
tion, as measured by the employment cost index, is
based implicitly on a model of bargaining over the
real wage. Because wages are typically based on
explicit and implicit multiperiod contracts, they are
less ﬂexible than prices: Wages adjust to their equi-
librium level at a rate estimated to be only 10 percent
per quarter. Abstracting from such frictions, the
ability of workers to bargain for a high real wage
depends on their relative bargaining power, which
declines during periods of high unemployment. In
diagram 3, this relationship is represented by the
upward-sloping line, which relates the inverse of the
real wage (the price markup) to the unemployment
rate.
In equilibrium, price inﬂation equals the growth
rate of unit costs, and the price markup over wages
chosen by ﬁrms equals the inverse of the real wage
resulting from the bargaining process. This equi-
librium in wage- and price-setting is shown by the
intersection of the two lines in diagram 3. This
intersection determines a unique equilibrium unem-
ployment rate consistent with proﬁt-maximizing
behavior of ﬁrms and the bargaining ability of work-
ers.15 Because the equilibrium unemployment rate
does not depend on the rate of inﬂation, it is the same
as the nonaccelerating inﬂation rate of unemploy-
ment (NAIRU). Because of short-run frictions, the
labor market is often not in equilibrium. When it is
not in equilibrium, wage and price inﬂation will tend
to rise when unemployment is below the NAIRU and
to fall when unemployment is above the NAIRU. But
inﬂation can also change for other reasons, such as a
movement in energy or import prices.
Equilibrium production costs depend on the proﬁt-
maximizing mix of capital, labor, and energy used in
production, and the mix, in turn, depends on the
after-tax cost of capital relative to the prices of other
factor inputs. The cost of capital increases as the
inﬂation-adjusted yield on bonds rises and decreases
as the price of shares in the stock market rises.
Equilibrium labor productivity, or output per unit of
labor input, is determined by two factors—long-run
trends, assumed to be exogenous, and the equilibrium
capital and energy intensity of production.
In the FRB/US model, a ﬁrm meets the demand for
its goods and services given the price it has set by
adjusting production and by building up or drawing
down inventory stocks. A ﬁrm can alter its level of
production by adjusting the number of labor hours
hired and by installing new equipment. In the model,
the responses of employment and investment depend
on the relative costs of labor and capital and on the
frictions that slow the adjustment of labor hours and
capital.
Because of the costs of adjusting total hours,
including the costs of hiring and training new work-
ers and of paying shift and overtime premiums, most
ﬁrms (covering an estimated two-thirds of private-
sector employment) are modeled as adjusting labor
input to its equilibrium level at a rate estimated to be
about 15 percent per quarter, thus smoothing labor
input over the business cycle. The remaining ﬁrms
(covering one-third of private-sector employment)
adjust hours immediately when demand changes by
laying off or recalling workers or by using temporary
help.
Rapidly altering the rate of equipment investment
to its equilibrium level is costly for ﬁrms, so their
15. Several theories of wage and price determination yield an
equilibrium unemployment rate like that in FRB/US. These theories
include labor market search, union wage bargaining, efﬁciency wages,
and insider–outsider interests in employment and compensation.
N. Gregory Mankiw and David Romer, eds., New Keynesian Econom-
ics (MIT Press, 1991), contains examples of such models.
3. Price and wage equilibrium
Unemployment rate NAIRU
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Prices. The main price variable in the FRB/US model, P xp,
is a domestic absorption (private domestic ﬁnal sales plus
exports, net of indirect taxes) price index. The equilibrium
price, P* xp, is a weighted average of the equilibrium price for
private output, P* xg, and the price of output from other
sectors less inventory change, P oth, and is inversely related
to the rate of unemployment, Lurda. The equilibrium private
output price—based on a three-factor Cobb–Douglas pro-
duction technology—is a markup over minimized cost. The
dynamic equation for P xp follows the framework for gradual
adjustment described in the text and is constrained to be
consistent with a vertical long-run Phillips curve; that is, the
coefﬁcients on lagged and future inﬂation sum to one. The
equation also contains terms that allow for the more rapid
adjustment of the prices of energy-intensive products, such
as retail gasoline, relative to that of the prices of other
goods.
(1) log P* xp = log((P* xgXg +P othXoth)/Xp) - .003Lurda + .019.
(2) log P* xg = .280 + .980 log(P l/Lprdgt) + .020 log P ceng.




w iDlog P xp, t - i
+ Et - 1{ S
i =0
¥
f iDlog P* xp, t + i}
+ .271we, t - 2D log P cengr, t - 1
- .047we, t - 3D log P cengr, t - 2.
Swi = .566. Sfi = .434.
Wages. The equilibrium nominal wage (compensation
per hour) is based on the same relationship that underlies
the equilibrium private output price, P* xg, with an additional
term reﬂecting the negative effect of the unemployment
rate on the equilibrium wage. As in the case of the dynamic
price equation, the wage equation follows the gradual
adjustment framework and is constrained to be consistent
with a vertical long-run Phillips curve. Three additional
terms—a dummy for wage and price controls, Dwpc, the
rate of growth of employer social insurance taxes, D Stax,
and the rate of increase of the real minimum wage,
D log P lminr—capture the rapid pass-through of changes in
these variables to actual wages.
(4) log P* l = .068 + log Lprdgt + 1.020 log P xg
- .020 log P ceng - .011Lurda.




w iDlog P l, t - i
+ Et - 1 { S
i =0
¥
f iDlog P* l, t + i}
- .009Dwpc, t + 1.400 D Stax, t
+ .023 D log P lminr, t.
Swi = .709. Sfi = .291.
Deﬁnitions
Dwpc= Dummy for Nixon wage–price controls.
Et - 1= Expectational operator, using information avail-
able at the end of the previous quarter, t - 1.
Lprdgt= Trend labor productivity.
Lurda= Demographically adjusted unemployment rate.
P ceng= Price index for crude energy consumption.
P cengr= Price for crude energy consumption relative to
price of nonfarm business output.
P l= Compensation per hour in nonfarm business.
P lminr= Minimum wage, deﬂated by hourly labor
compensation.
P oth= Price index for Xoth.
P xg= Price index for Xg.
P xp= Price index for Xp.
Stax= Employer social insurance premiums, deﬂated by
total labor compensation.
Xg= Nonfarm, nonhousing business output plus oil
imports (net of indirect business taxes).
Xoth= Output of housing, farm, household, and insti-
tutional sectors plus government output (net of
employee compensation) plus non-petroleum
imports less inventory investment.
Xp= Private domestic ﬁnal sales (net of sales taxes and
other indirect taxes) plus exports.
we= Energy share of output.
*= Equilibrium value.
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costs of capital, labor, and energy proceeds relatively
slowly, at a rate estimated to be 15 percent per
quarter in the FRB/US model. In addition, for a group
of ﬁrms (accounting for about 20 percent of invest-
ment), proﬁt-maximizing investment plans are con-
strained by their limited access to external sources of
funds. For these ﬁrms, investment is determined by
available cash ﬂow.
Government Sector
In the FRB/US model, the government inﬂuences
macroeconomic conditions through three activities:
monetary policy carried out by the Federal Reserve,
ﬁscal policy carried out by the federal government,
and the spending and tax actions of state and local
governments.
Monetary policy is characterized by an equation
for the level of the federal funds rate. In model
simulations, policymakers are assumed to set the
federal funds rate to stabilize the rate of inﬂation at
some target level and to hold aggregate demand near
the level consistent with full employment. The key
characteristics of such a policy are the rate of inﬂa-
tion that policymakers hope to achieve over time—
the inﬂation target—and the sensitivity of the federal
funds rate to deviations of actual inﬂation from this
objective and to deviations of the level of economic
activity from its potential.
The activities of the federal government are sum-
marized by a group of equations that describe the
setting of tax rates (on personal and corporate
incomes, payrolls, and the sales value of some goods)
and the level of spending (on employee compensa-
tion, investment, other purchases of goods and ser-
vices, transfer payments, net subsidies to government
enterprises, and grants to state and local govern-
ments). Federal debt (the accumulation of deﬁcits
over time) is ﬁnanced through the issuance of Trea-
sury bills and bonds. A similar set of equations
describes the aggregate tax and spending policies of
state and local governments.
EXPECTATIONS IN ACTION:
MODEL SIMULATIONS
So far the discussion has focused on the way in
which expectations affect the decisions of ﬁrms and
households. Now it turns to the interactions of these
sectors of the economy and, through model simula-
tions, explores the role of expectations in the behav-
ior of aggregate production, employment, and inﬂa-
tion. Speciﬁcally, the FRB/US model is used to
predict how the overall economy would respond to
two hypothetical events—a tightening in ﬁscal policy
achieved through a permanent reduction in defense
spending and an increase in the price of oil.
In the analysis of the ﬁrst scenario, a critical factor
is the speed with which the public recognizes that a
change in the economic environment has occurred or
will occur. The model can be simulated with several
possibilities, including gradual learning about the
change after it has occurred, recognition of the
change at the time it occurs, and anticipation of the
change before it occurs. All three possibilities are
relevant for ﬁscal policy, so the analysis of the cut-
back in defense spending focuses on the sensitivity of
the model’s predictions to changes in recognition
speed.
For the second scenario, the recognition problem
does not concern oil prices per se (these are readily
observable) but instead the anticipated response of
monetary policy to the rise in oil prices. Speciﬁcally,
the public might think that a change in policy has
occurred when none actually has. The macroeco-
nomic implications of such a possibility is the focus
of this analysis.
To simulate the effects of these events, a baseline
forecast of economic activity is generated given a set
of assumptions for ﬁscal and monetary policy, for-
eign economic conditions, oil prices, and so forth.
Then the model is run again under the assumption
that one of these factors—government spending or
the price of oil—changes. A comparison of the base-
line and simulation forecasts indicates the way the
economy would react to such an event (according to
the FRB/US model).
Simulation of economic events permits the tracing
of the dynamic responses of households and ﬁrms
to changes in the economic environment. It shows
how adjustment costs give rise to macroeconomic
disequilibrium—transitory deviations of aggregate
demand from the economy’s full-employment level
of production. Such disequilibrium explains, for
example, why many policies that may be beneﬁcial in
the long run, such as a reduction in federal borrowing
or a return to price stability, often carry with them
short-run costs in the form of reduced income and
higher unemployment.
Tightening of Fiscal Policy
In the ﬁrst hypothetical event, the Congress passes
legislation that reduces annual defense expenditures
240 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1997relative to baseline by 1⁄2 percent of GDP in the ﬁrst
year of the program and 1 percent in the second year.
The annual reduction in non-interest outlays, ex-
pressed as a percentage of GDP, remains at this level
thereafter.16 The improvement in the overall budget
balance is assumed to be a similar percentage of
GDP; taxes are adjusted to offset interest savings
generated by a reduction in federal borrowing. Mone-
tary policy makers are assumed to act to stabilize the
economy by gradually lowering the federal funds rate
whenever the level of real activity is below its poten-
tial and inﬂation is less than the targeted rate; when
the opposite is true, they raise the funds rate.17
Effects under Immediate and Gradual Recognition
The macroeconomic effects of the tightening of ﬁscal
policy, under the assumption that households and
ﬁrms have VAR expectations, are summarized in
diagram 4. Results are shown for two different char-
acterizations of the speed with which the public rec-
ognizes the extent of the change in policy: (1) The
public at the start of the program recognizes the full
implications of the policy change for the long-run
value of the real federal funds rate, and (2) the public
only gradually revises its estimate of the equilibrium
real funds rate, on the basis of observed changes in
actual rates of inﬂation and interest. In both cases, the
public’s beliefs about the long-run rate of inﬂation (in
other words, about the inﬂation goals of monetary
policy makers) are unaffected by the change in ﬁscal
policy.
Under either assumption about the speed of rec-
ognition, the cuts in defense spending weaken aggre-
gate demand—ﬁrst by decreasing the sales of defense
contractors and then by decreasing sales in other
sectors that supply goods and services to the defense
industry and its workers. The initial effect is mag-
niﬁed as ﬁrms reduce employment and household
spending responds to the loss in current income.
Firms and households project (more or less correctly)
that the initial decline in the level of aggregate sales,
employment, and income will persist for a few years.
Accordingly, ﬁrms cut back on their capital spending
16. Such cuts would be only half as great as the actual decline in
defense spending since the end of the cold war: Expenditures have
fallen from about 51⁄2 percent of GDP in 1989–91 to about 31⁄2 percent
today.
17. The speed at which policy responds to changes in real activity
and inﬂation is based on an equation for the funds rate estimated over
1980–95.
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The Role of Expectations in the FRB/US Macroeconomic Model 241and further reduce their demand for labor; house-
holds moderate their spending on consumer goods
and housing. Under these conditions, unemployment
rises.
The initial increase in unemployment is smaller if
the public fails to recognize immediately the size and
persistence of the change in ﬁscal policy; in this
situation, households and ﬁrms underestimate the full
contractionary effect of the cuts and see less need
to reduce their spending. In contrast, even though
immediate recognition magniﬁes the short-run conse-
quences of the policy change, it nonetheless hastens
the return to equilibrium because in this situation
ﬁrms and households understand a key fact about the
economy as represented by FRB/US: A permanent
decline in the federal budget deﬁcit, by raising the
economy’s aggregate rate of saving, lowers the long-
term real funds rate consistent with full employ-
ment.18 Therefore, with monetary policy directed
toward keeping the rate of inﬂation unchanged, the
public forecasts that the nominal federal funds rate
will quickly fall to a lower level and remain there
permanently. This view leads to a drop in bond yields
immediately upon enactment of the cuts in defense
spending.19 By contrast, when recognition is gradual,
bond yields decline more slowly because ﬁrms and
households only sluggishly revise their estimate of
the long-run level of the federal funds rate.
Whether the public reacts quickly or slowly, com-
petitive forces in ﬁnancial markets ensure that the
decline in bond yields is accompanied by falling
mortgage rates, rising stock prices, and a depreciating
dollar. These changes in wealth and borrowing condi-
tions spur consumer spending and domestic capital
formation and increase the net foreign demand for
U.S. goods. Eventually, the stimulus from favorable
ﬁnancial conditions fully offsets the contractionary
effect of the cuts in defense spending, and unemploy-
ment returns to its baseline level. This return takes
ﬁve years if recognition is immediate and consider-
ably longer if the public only gradually revises its
notions of the long-term state of the economy.
Effects of Prior Recognition
In the preceding simulations, the public either recog-
nizes the economic implications of the spending cut
as soon as it is implemented or learns about them as
time passes. The public might, however, anticipate
the policy change before its actual implementation.
Such prior recognition could arise when the Congress
passes legislation containing provisions that take
effect at a later date. Prior recognition could also
occur when a prolonged period of discussion within
and outside the government has preceded the passage
of legislation (as, for example, the public debate over
the likely size of future cuts in defense spending that
began immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall,
well before an actual reduction in spending).
If ﬁrms and households recognize a policy change
before its enactment, they can begin to adjust early.
Diagram 5 shows the response of the economy to the
cuts in defense spending discussed earlier under two
assumptions: (1) the public recognizes the full change
in policy when the initial cuts are ﬁrst enacted and
(2) the public anticipates the change two years before
it occurs. In both cases, households and ﬁrms are
assumed to have model-consistent expectations.20
As can be seen, prior recognition causes the econ-
omy to strengthen in advance of the spending cuts.
The source of this early pickup in activity is the
public’s knowledge that the coming change in ﬁscal
policy is associated with a lower federal funds rate in
the long run. As a result of this expectation, bond
yields fall two years before the spending cuts take
place. The stimulus from this reduction in borrowing
costs—combined with the effects of higher stock
prices and a lower foreign exchange value of the
dollar—initially increases aggregate demand, particu-
larly in the areas of investment goods and net exports.
As a result, the unemployment rate falls before the
change in policy, and in response, the federal funds
rate rises. However, once the spending cuts are imple- 18. In FRB/US, inﬂation stability is achieved only if the unemploy-
ment rate equals the NAIRU or, equivalently, only if aggregate
demand equals the potential level of output. The real interest rate that
achieves this equality is the equilibrium real rate. Because aggregate
demand is positively related to government spending and negatively
related to the real interest rate, a permanent decline in government
spending must, if equilibrium is to be restored, be offset by a perma-
nent decline in the real interest rate.
19. The initial decline in long-term interest rates is smaller than the
eventual fall, primarily because the term premiums demanded by
investors increase with the slowdown in economic activity. Once the
level of activity returns to normal, term premiums return to baseline
values.
20. Comparison of the black lines in diagrams 4 and 5 shows that
altering the scope of the public’s knowledge about the economy has
little effect on the predicted macroeconomic consequences of the
change in ﬁscal policy: For this hypothetical event, what matters is not
whether the public has VAR (diagram 4) or model-consistent (dia-
gram 5) expectations, but the speed at which they recognize that a
change has occurred. For other scenarios (such as that of the oil price
shock), however, altering the scope of the public’s knowledge does
signiﬁcantly affect the model’s predictions.
242 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1997mented, the rise in aggregate demand is reversed, and
the pattern of economic activity is roughly the same
as if the change had not been recognized in advance.
Rise in Oil Prices
In the simulations involving a cut in defense spend-
ing, households and ﬁrms face the problem of dis-
cerning the long-run objectives of ﬁscal policy. In
one case they recognize the complete details of the
program immediately upon enactment; in others they
either learn about the change over time or anticipate
it in advance. In gauging the likely effects of their
actions, policymakers must accept that any of these
reactions is possible and that policy actions can inﬂu-
ence but not wholly control the public’s speed
of recognition (or any other aspect of the public’s
beliefs).
Conceivably, there are circumstances in which the
public may come to perceive a change in policy when
none has occurred. Such a situation might arise, for
example, in the context of a large increase in the
price of oil, like the ones that occurred during the
middle and late 1970s. Consider a simulation in
which oil prices double over the course of a year and
remain at this higher level for several years there-
after.21 This situation is illustrated in diagram 6,
under the assumption that ﬁrms and households have
VAR expectations. As can be seen, such an energy
shock would produce a large initial spike in con-
sumer price inﬂation.
In one situation (curve labeled ‘‘Correct’’ in dia-
gram), the initial rise in inﬂation is assumed to have
no effect on the public’s beliefs concerning the goals
of monetary policy; the public has conﬁdence in the
government’s commitment to restoring the baseline
rate of inﬂation and does not change its expectations
regarding inﬂation in the long run. In an alternative
situation (curve labeled ‘‘Incorrect’’), the public, see-
ing that inﬂation has risen, modiﬁes its views about
21. A price increase of this magnitude would be considerably
smaller than the 250 percent rise in 1973–74 but about the same size
as that in 1979–80.
5. Simulated consequences of a cutback in defense spending when policy change is recognized
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The Role of Expectations in the FRB/US Macroeconomic Model 243the long-run target for inﬂation, even though the
goals of policy have not changed. Under such circum-
stances the price spike leads to expectations of a
signﬁcant increase in long-run inﬂation. Only after
policymakers prove their commitment to a noninﬂa-
tionary path and achieve a reduction in the actual rate
of inﬂation—a process that takes several years—do
expectations of long-run inﬂation return to baseline.
The rise in oil prices affects households and ﬁrms
in similar ways under the two assumptions about
expectations. For example, in both cases higher oil
prices feed directly into higher prices for gasoline,
heating oil, and other sources of energy. The higher
energy bill puts pressure on ﬁrms’ proﬁt margins, and
thus on prices, while workers demand higher wages
as the cost of living rises. Because wages adjust more
slowly than prices, the real wage falls and depresses
the demand for consumer goods. Consumption
spending is further restrained by the increase in the
share of aggregate income ﬂowing overseas to pay
for imported oil. Under these circumstances, unem-
ployment rises.
The resultant weakness in aggregate spending is
only transitory. Because the goal of monetary policy
is to stabilize the economy, the federal funds rate
initially rises in response to the original spike in
inﬂation but later falls below baseline as inﬂation
moderates and unemployment rises. With inﬂation
close to baseline after three years, the implied reduc-
tion in the real interest rate is sufﬁcient to eventually
offset the contractionary effects of higher oil prices.
The cost of bringing inﬂation down to its original
level is greater, in terms of the cumulative increase in
unemployment, if the public thinks that the target rate
of inﬂation has risen. This extra cost arises because
the public’s misperception of policy leads it to make
two forecasting errors: (1) an overstatement of the
future rate of growth of unit labor costs (the wage
rate adjusted for productivity growth) and (2) an
understatement of the average future level of unem-
ployment. The ﬁrst error is a direct consequence of
the policy misperception, because equilibrium in
FRB/US requires that the rate of growth of unit labor
costs must equal the target rate of inﬂation in the long
run. The second error results from the mistaken belief
that monetary policy makers will allow inﬂation to
remain permanently higher instead of bringing it
back to baseline by restraining aggregate demand.
Because the actual rate of inﬂation depends on the
expected growth of unit labor costs and the future
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244 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1997level of unemployment (as well as on lagged inﬂa-
tion), the two forecasting errors exacerbate the inﬂa-
tion problem created by higher oil prices. To offset
this additional source of inﬂationary pressure, the
stance of monetary policy must be tighter on average.
The need for this tighter stance does not disappear
until the policy misperception is corrected through an
actual reduction in inﬂation.
CONCLUSION
These simulations provide a glimpse of the key role
that expectations play in the new macroeconomic
model of the U.S. economy used at the Federal
Reserve Board and the ways in which they affect
predictions of the economy’s response to distur-
bances in aggregate supply and demand. As noted
earlier, economists do not agree on the appropriate
treatment of expectations in macroeconomic models.
Thus, the FRB/US model was designed to be ﬂexible
with respect to the formation of expectations. A
subject of ongoing research is the way in which ﬁrms
and households modify their method of forming
expectations in light of new evidence—that is, how
they learn about the structure of the changing eco-
nomic environment. The FRB/US model provides a
framework for analyzing this and other issues.
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